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Abstract: 
 
This thesis is concerned with the role of the United States investment insurance 
agency, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), in enforcing property 
and contract rights on behalf of United States (U.S.) infrastructure investors, 
pursuant to the deregulation of infrastructure markets across the developing world. 
Drawing on evidence from two recent high profile breach of regulatory contract 
disputes between OPIC insured U.S. energy companies and Indonesia and India 
respectively, the thesis finds that while legalized modes of dispute settlement have 
proliferated, the ‘rules of the game’— their efficacy in delimiting outcomes—emerge 
as a function of state power and interests, as states undertake to enforce or resist 
legal obligations. Second, and contrary to the image of U.S. foreign economic policy-
makers as beholden to corporate interests, the thesis finds that the agency’s 
transformation from ‘aid to trade’ as underpinned the expansion of U.S. 
infrastructure investors to the developing world during the 1990s was driven by state 
officials consistent with evolving conceptions of U.S. national interests, central to 
which was the desire to expand markets for U.S. foreign investors and capital goods 
exporters. In this regard, the transformation of developing country infrastructure 
markets and the shift in the modes of resolving investor-state expropriation disputes 
as but one element of economic globalization and the ‘legalization’ of dispute 
settlement respectively are revealed as a function of U.S. material interests and power 
at the point of enforcement. The thesis contends, however, that the changes observed 
reflect not only U.S. power and interests but a specifically American conception of 
private property and contract rights so as to reveal OPIC investment insurance as a 
conduit for the diffusion of shifting property norms concerning regulatory taking 
(expropriation) from the United States to the world economy at large.   
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